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Executive Summary
In this paper, we define jurisdictional advantage, the recognition that location
is critical to firms' innovative success and that every location has unique assets
that are not easily replicated. Drawing from the well-developed literature on
corporate strategy, we consider analogies to cities in their search for competi-
tive advantage. We argue that jurisdictions may benefit from a strategic orien-
tation that considers the unique and not easily replicated assets, resources, and
skifi set contained in a jurisdiction; the position of the jurisdiction vis-à-vis the
hierarchy of cities in the national and world economy; and the maximization of
wages and property values within the jurisdiction. We review recent advances
in our understanding of patterns of urban specialization and the composition
of activities within cities, which suggest strategies that may generate economic
growth and some strategies to avoid. This paper then considers the role of
firms and their responsibifity to jurisdictions in light of the net benefits
received from place-specific externalities, and it concludes by considering the
challenges to implementing jurisdictional advantage.
I.Introduction
Economic growth is a preoccupation among economists and govern-
ment policy makers. Traditionally the focus has been at the national
level; however, research has shifted the focus to smaller geographic
units defined as clusters of industrial activities, or alternatively as
regions. The literature suggests that economic growth is a local process
and that cities are an important, if not the most important, economic
unit in generating new development, competitiveness, and prosperity.
When we talk about geographically-defined clusters of industrial activ-
ity or regional economic development, we are really talking about
cities and the activities that take place within the city's sphere of influ-
ence.1 It has not been popular to talk about cities in a policy context for58 Feldman and Martin
several decades in the United States; however, the new economic geog-
raphy literature suggests that the time has come to focus on cities and
the construction of what we term jurisdictional advantage as a means
to promote economic growth and prosperity.
Research has established that cities, due to the geographic proximity
of firms and other institutions, provide localized knowledge external-
ities or spifiovers that provide positive economic value. Cities increase
opportunities for interaction that facifitates learning and the absorption
of knowledge, provide a venue for experimentation with new ideas,
and enhance the abffity to exchange ideas and engage with others who
have relevant expertise. As a result, firms in these locations enjoy
higher productivity, experience greater innovation and growth, and
pay higher wages. A growing literature documents these advantages;
however, these topics have more than an academic interest. The litera-
ture begs the question: if you are responsible for a jurisdiction, what
should you do to promote prosperity and economic growth?
Our objective in this paper is to define jurisdictional advantage: the
recognition that location is critical to firms' innovative success and
that every location has unique assets that are not easily replicated. The
purpose is to be normative and policy-oriented. Drawing from the
well-developed literature on corporate strategy, we consider analogies
to cities in their search for competitive advantage. In contrast to the
more passive term locational advantage, our use of the term jurisdiction
denotes geographically defined legal and political decision-making
authority and coordination. Thus, jurisdictions may be constructed
and managed to promote a coherent activity set. We review recent ad-
vances in our understanding of patterns of urban specialization and
the composition of activities within cities, which suggest strategies
that may generate economic growth and some strategies to avoid. This
paper then considers the role of firms and their responsibility to juris-
dictions in light of the net benefits received from place-specific
externalities, and we conclude by considering the challenges to imple-
menting jurisdictional advantage.
II.Alternatives to Shaping a Jurisdiction
Two extreme philosophies are available to policy makers for fostering
economic development. One potential approach is laissez-faire, simply
letting market forces work. The rationale is that industrial clusters that
are part of successful cities arise for various historically contingent orJurisdictional Advantage 59
serendipitous factors not easily replicated. Firms locate and invest in a
particular city for reasons that are not well understood, much less pre-
dictable and controllable. This view suggests that the most constructive
path a jurisdiction can take is to let market forces determine its future
fate and simply hope for the best. Given the challenges of jurisdictional
decision making, the laissez-faire approach has some appeal, but it has
drawbacks. Industrial development demonstrates high levels of path
dependence and increasing returns, so if a city misses out on an impor-
tant trend, new technology, or infrastructure investment on the basis of
a laissez-faire attitude, it may miss out for a long time. The existence of
market failures associated with innovative activity inhibits the efficient
allocation of resources, suggesting a role for government involvement.
An opposing philosophy advocates aggressive planning toward a
targeted industry, an "if you build it they will come" philosophy.
Typically, politicians and civic leaders focus on some emerging,
high-growth industry with great fanfare, high-profile events, and the
commitment of substantial public resources. These efforts are often
mimicked by similar jurisdictions in a classic bandwagon effect. For
example, forty-eight of the fifty states currently have biotechnology
initiatives (Biotechnology Industry Organization 2001). Most of these
focus on human therapeutics and attempt to leverage local universities
and medical schools.
Numerous examples ifiustrate that governments have not been able
to establish clusters by fiat. One such example is New Jersey's failed at-
tempt to replicate the success of Silicon Valley (Leslie and Kargon
1997). Despite the presence of prominent research universities and sub-
stantial private-sector research and development (R&D), the net effect
was several strategic partnerships rather than broadbased economic
development. Even in cases where policy makers were able to imple-
ment an economic development vision, as in the case of Research Tri-
angle Park, Link (1995, 2002) documents that it took over fifty years of
concerted efforts to begin to realize measurable outcomes. Even when
efforts are successful at generating startup companies, it is difficult for
a jurisdiction to gamer long-term benefits if complementary assets are
lacking (Connecticut Center for a New Economy 2004).
The nature of innovation makes it difficult to dictate industrial
clusters. Commercializing technological breakthroughs requires trans-
lating scientific potential into consumer needs and product markets.
At its earliest stages, before applications are easily described or gen-
erally appreciated, locating near the center of innovative activity60 Feldman and Martin
provides critical competitive business advantage. Realizing the poten-
tial of a technological breakthrough requires a sophisticated under-
standing of consumer needs, existing markets for product innovation,
factor inputs, and prevailing production technology. Co-location
increases awareness of emerging trends and reduces uncertainty for
firms. Innovation clusters in physical locations where knowledge exter-
nalities reduce the costs of discovery and commercialization.
When a technology reaches a stage when it can be easily understood
and valued, the established centersthe first moversalready have
an advantage. Increasing returns is a feature of innovation and knowl-
edge-based industrial activity. As a result, activities that are ahead
tend to move even further ahead (Arthur 1996). By the time an indus-
try is well-known enough to be targeted for economic development,
other jurisdictions have probably already captured the lion's share
of the benefits and are positioned for greater advantage. The path of
emerging industries is difficult to predict and is extremely fluid. Plan-
ning efforts based on current assumptions wifi never be able to antici-
pate future scientific developments and the direction that a technology
may take. Consider the Internet as a case in point. In 1990, few if any
jurisdictions focused on this technology, but by the middle of the de-
cade, the country was caught in dot-corn mania, with numerous pub-
lic-sector initiatives, tax incentives, and business incubators that have
mostly been abandoned now.
A middle alternative to the two philosophies discussed may be to
influence the quality and shape of economic outcomes by making
judicious investments and avoiding costly mistakesdeliberately con-
structing jurisdictional advantage by building on existing, not easily
replicated resources and by complementing private-sector activities.
The pursuit of jurisdictional advantage is not without challenges be-
cause so many factors influence the outcomes. Because future prosper-
ity and quality of life are at stake, however, the questions about how to
pursue this goal are of more than just academic interest.
III.Corporate Strategy as an Analogy
We believe a helpful analogy can be made between jurisdictions and
firms with respect to strategic advantage. Certainly, cities have more
complex objective functions overall than do firms. When we think
about economic development specifically within the context of cluster
formation and industrial competitiveness, however, the analogy is in-Jurisdictional Advantage 61
structive. For firms, the overarching goal is to gain and maintain com-
petitive advantage, which translates into above-average returns for
shareholders. The way to achieve competitive advantage is to create a
competitive strategy that is consistent with trends in the firm's indus-
try and appropriate to the firm's resources and capabilities.
One important school of competitive strategy holds that competitive
advantage arises from the concept of creating a imique activity system,
which is achieved either by an advantage of low cost or by way of dif-
ferentiation (Porter 1980). A web of activities, when working together,
provides an advantage that is difficult, if not impossible, for competi-
tors to replicate because the individual activities fit well together and
actually reinforce each other. For example, Southwest Airlines has
been the most successful airline in the U.S. market over the past thirty
years, in level of profitability, stabifity of earnings,and growth in mar-
ket share. It does not achieve competitive advantage through any sin-
gle service that it provides, such as flying a standard fleet of Boeing
737s, flying from secondary airports, having the most frequent daily
departures from each of its locations, or utilizing the Internet rather
than travel agents for booking. Rather, Southwest achieves its advan-
tage by performing all of these activities (and more) in ways that fit
together and reinforce each other to produce a significant and sustain-
able cost advantage over all of its competitors, all the while offering
high and consistent service to its customers. Any competitor would
have to match every single aspect of Southwest's activity system to
challenge the overall outcomeand thus far no competitor has been
successful in doing so (Porter 1996).
The activity system can provide a low-cost advantage by enabling
the firm to produce a product or service for a segment of customers
that is roughly equivalent to that of the competitor at a significantly
lower costresulting in higher profitability than the average competi-
tor, as is the case for Southwest Airlines. Note that being a low-cost
firm is not the same as being a low-price firm. Having the same cost
structure as competitors and deciding to sell at a lower profit margin
is not a strategy for long-term advantage, but rather a strategy of trans-
ferring value from corporate shareholders to customers. It is simply
not a sustainable long-term strategy. Any competitive firm that objects
to inroads made on the base of a low-price approach can simply cut its
own prices and margins to compete. This approach ultimately leads to
a race to the bottom in terms of profitability. And any firmwith a cost
advantage in the industry in question wifi be able to set prices lower62 Feldman and Martin
and force the low-price player out of the industry. In many respects,
numerous dot-corn bubble firms employed the ultimate low-price
strategygiving away their product or serviceand confused both
themselves and the capital markets into believing it was a sensible
strategy. It was not sound because low price is not a viable strategy in
the absence of low costs.
A firm's activity system can also provide a differentiation advantage
by enabling the firm to produce a product or service that is considered
to be uniquely more valuable than those of its competitors by a seg-
ment of customers and for which those customers are willing, even
happy, to pay a premium price. For example, Progressive Insurance
offers a differentiated automobile insurance service to a nonstandard
segment of drivers. It offers quotes that are better-tailored to the true
risk category of drivers and provides quick and easy settlement of
claims by way of an extensive fleet of van-based adjusters. Like South-
west Airlines, Progressive also has a unique activity system that fea-
tures many activitiessuch as its massive pricing database, a fleet of
claims-settling vans, unique training and compensation structures, and
a unique investment philosophythat fit together and reinforce each
other to produce a service that is highly valued by its customers and is
produced at a competitive cost.
A competitive cost structure is important to the differentiation strat-
egy because having a premium price with a cost structure that eats up
the entire premium is not a strategy for long-term competitive advan-
tage. It is a strategy for satisfying customers but not for providing ade-
quate returns to shareholders. Keeping the cost structure under control
requires an activity system that minimizes the total systems cost of
providing a differentiated product or service.
The concepts of strategy and strategic thinking have become well-
accepted by firms over the past thirty years. Strategy allows firms to
define what they are about and, most important, what they are not
about. In the next section of the paper, we argue that a city or region
may seek to attain jurisdictional advantage by building a unique activ-
ity system that is valuable in producing either a low-cost or differentia-
tion advantage over other jurisdictions.
IV.Seeking Jurisdictional Advantage
Because a jurisdiction does not have shareholders per se, the question
is, Who should benefit from the jurisdiction's decisions? Over 300Jurisdictional Advantage 63
years ago, John Locke argued that government is the vehicle for col-
lective action (Locke 1967). Like firms, jurisdictions are socially con-
structed entities that can raise funds, organize resources, and live on in
perpetuity, or at least accomplish these goals better than individuals
can. Locke's argument is that government is a legitimate tool by which
individuals may further their shared interests by acting in common.
While these shared interests should not rest on any particular concep-
tion of the common good or individual happiness, it is a fundamental
premise of Locke's argument that income and wealth are instrumental
goods desired, to some extent, by everyone.
A measure of the common good is the prevailing wealth in the juris-
diction. Wealth is a combination of wages and investments. For most
of the world's population, housing equity represents the single largest
investment, and the value of jurisdictional amenities and local quality
of life is capitalized in housing prices. Higher levels of local public
services, higher local wages, and a growing local economy all contrib-
ute to appreciation of real estate values and the wealth of property
owners. Because the majority of American households own their own
homes, increases in property values are broadly distributed across the
population. Increases in property values yield higher tax revenues for
the jurisdiction. If these revenues are used judiciously, they increase
amenities. In this way, virtuous cycles of economic growth are created.
Wages are an important measure of the wealth of the jurisdiction.
The greater the positive variance in wage levels from the mean, the
greater the jurisdictional advantage from which the residents benefit,
other things being equal. However, two adjustments should be made
to this measure. First, when comparing jurisdictions across countries,
wages adjusted for purchasing power parity should be the measure, as
is the case when comparing gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.
Second, an additional refinement should adjust after-tax wages for
major differences in government services and amenities provided. So
if after-tax wages were used to compare the jurisdiction of a U.S. city
with a Canadian city, an adjustment should be made for the fact that
the residents of the Canadian city receive greater health care benefits
through government expenditure. For individuals living in the United
States, more of their health care costs would be paid for from after-tax
wages.
Table 3.1 presents differences in wages by jurisdiction for those
industries with some demonstrated competitive advantage. As a
benchmark, the average annual wage for all U.S. industries wasTable 3.1























Atlanta, GA 56,129 2.8 1.51 $59,783 Distribution
services
Atlanta, GA 148,591 3 1.6 $56,152 Business services
Augusta- 20,053 4.8 30.96 $50,352 Chemical products
Aiken, GA-SC
Baltimore, MD 12,034 1.6 1.74 $61,459 Analytical
instruments









11,865 0.9 2.31 $44,210 Metal
manufacturing
Boston, MA 158,727 4.7 1.75 $92,432 Financial services
Boston, MA 54,811 6 2.25 $77,380 Information
technology
Boston, MA 35,210 7.9 2.94 $75,875 Communications
equipment
Boston, MA 209,555 4.2 1.56 $67,853 Business services
Boston, MA 76,299 3.8 1.42 $64,680 Distribution
services
Boston, MA 23,238 6.3 2.35 $59,361 Medical devices
Chicago, IL 158,055 4.7 1.37 $86,033 Financial services
Chicago, IL 214,430 4.3 1.25 $61,173 Business services
Chicago, IL 40,846 9.1 2.68 $59,679 Communications
equipment
Chicago, IL 87,392 4.3 1.28 $58,551 Distribution
services




20,876 3.2 3.46 $47,829 Production
technology
Cleveland- 26,960 2.1 2.26 $46,692 Automotive
Lorain-Elyria








area ment ment quotientwages cluster
Cleveland-
Lorain-Elyria
14,610 1.8 1.88 $38,754 Oil and gas
products and
services
Dallas, TX 29,052 6.5 3.9 $71,003 Communications
equipment
Dallas, TX 10,253 2.6 1.54 $64,697 Oil and gas
products and
services
Dallas, TX 59,094 2.9 1.76 $61,521 Distribution
services
Dallas, TX 121,056 2.4 1.45 $60,309 Business services
Denver, CO 73,909 1.5 1.57 $57,173 Business services
Detroit, MI 138,769 10.9 6.41 $54,082 Automotive




16,833 5.9 62.03 $35,112 Prefabricated
enclosures
Flint, MT 17,282 1.4 10.73 $48,404 Automotive
Fort Wayne, IN 16,218 1.3 6.01 $49,399 Automotive
Gary, IN 27,400 2 10.28 $52,849 Metal
manufacturing
Grand Rapids 32,126 2.5 5.46 $46,289 Automotive
Hartford, CT 14,207 15.8 32.02 $78,031 Aerospace engines
Hickory, NC 10,004 2.1 14.3 $39,128 Apparel
Houston, TX 66,657 16.6 10.23 $66,786 Oil and gas
products and
services
Houston, TX 15,189 3.6 2.22 $65,260 Chemical products
Houston, TX 109,070 2.2 1.33 $58,980 Business services
Houston, TX 50,862 3.1 1.93 $45,766 Transportation and
logistics





12,831 0.9 1.34 $38,369 Metal
manufacturing(continued)






Metropolitan employ-employ-location average Industry
area ment ment quotient wages cluster
Los Angeles-
Long Beach,
18,517 4.1 1.22 $63,183 Communications
equipment
CA
Los Angeles- 51,679 13.8 4.09 $58,420 Aerospace vehicles
Long Beach,
CA











97,201 4.2 1.24 $36,133 Education and
knowledge
creation
















18,683 2.5 1.75 $53,438 Analytical
instruments
















29,699 1.3 1.86 $52,508 Education and
knowledge
creation
New York, NY 316,922 9.4 2.8 $197,932 Financial services








area ment ment quotient wages cluster
New York, NY 63,529 5.8 1.73 $62,215 Entertaimnent
New York, NY 101,419 5 1.51 $60,767 Distribution
services
New York, NY 75,249 4.6 1.39 $45,317 Transportation and
logistics
New York, NY 29,807 24.6 7.34 $40,021 Jewelry and
precious metals
New York, NY 151,514 6.5 1.96 $39,511 Education and
knowledge
creation
Newark, NJ 21,619 8.2 10.04 $67,911 Biopharmaceuticals
Newark, NJ 31,830 1.6 1.93 $61,268 Distribution
services
Newark, NJ 39,777 2.5 2.99 $43,270 Transportation and
logistics
Oakland, CA 19,104 2.1 2.41 $100,139 Information
technology
Oaldand, CA 14,675 2 2.26 $69,869 Analytical
instruments
Oakland, CA 71,694 1.4 1.64 $66,537 Business services
Orange 43,632 2.2 1.77 $55,800 Distribution
County, CA services
Orange 84,540 1.7 1.37 $55,305 Business services
County, CA
Orange 10,625 2.9 2.35 $51,700 Medical devices
County, CA
Orange 12,326 1.5 1.21 $35,591 Oil and gas
County, CA products and
services
Philadelphia, 9,878 3.8 1.93 $86,730 Biopharmaceuticals
PA-NJ
Philadelphia, 126,249 2.5 1.29 $58,795 Business services
PA-NJ
Philadelphia, 48,384 2.4 1.24 $56,805 Distribution
PA-NJ services
Philadelphia, 27,268 2.8 1.46 $43,284 Publishing and
PA-NJ printing
(continued)(continued)






Metropolitan employ-employ-location average Industry
area ment ment quotient wages cluster
Philadelphia,
PA-NJ





15,331 2 1.68 $53,945 Analytical
instruments
Pittsburgh, PA 26,910 2 2.19 $45,545 Metal
manufacturing
Pittsburgh, PA 43,504 1.9 2.08 $32,817 Education and
knowledge
creation




32,349 1.4 2.62 $51,518 Education and
knowledge
creation
San Antonio, 26,285 1.4 2.57 $38,964 Heavy
construction
services
San Diego, CA 28,001 1.4 1.48 $83,345 Distribution
services
San Diego, CA 42,826 1.8 1.97 $56,348 Education and
knowledge
creation
San Diego, CA 13,483 1.8 1.92 $56,319 Analytical
instruments




26,325 2.9 3.17 $119,291 Information
technology












27,322 1.2 1.29 $56,554 Education and
knowledge









area ment ment quotient wages cluster
San Francisco,
CA
34,604 2.1 2.34 $40,466 Transportation and
logistics
San Francisco, 16,227 1.5 1.62 $34,035 Entertainment
CA
San Jose, CA 52,982 2.6 2.9 $109,766 Distribution
services
San Jose, CA 92,453 10.2 11.2 $108,801 Information
technology
San Jose, CA 121,537 2.4 2.67 $89,569 Business services
San Jose, CA 40,001 1.7 1.91 $83,827 Education and
knowledge
creation
San Jose, CA 24,592 5.5 6.06 $81,775 Communications
equipment
San Jose, CA 12,536 3.4 3.74 $76,901 Medical devices
San Jose, CA 48,569 6.5 7.16 $74,991 Analytical
instruments
Seattle, WA 37,469 4.1 3.72 $228,178 Information
technology
Seattle, WA 29,856 1.5 1.34 $59,477Distribution
services
Seattle, WA 38,166 2.4 2.13 $48,397 Transportation and
logistics
St. Louis, MO- 14,213 1.3 1.22 $85,875 Entertainment
IL
Toledo, OH 20,722 1.6 6.55 $49,607 Automotive













10,122 2.3 5.54 $67,379 Communications
equipment70 Feldman and Martin
approximately $33,200 in 2001. We list city-industries with a higher-
than-average national wage for the industry; a location quotient
greater than 1, indicating geographic concentration relative to national
employment; and more than 10,000 employment. This table demon-
strates that cities specialize in certain industrial clusters but that spe-
cialization varies widely across cities in the same industry.
Creating and sustaining positive wage differentials is the essence of
jurisdictional advantage. Note that this approach is not synonymous
with attracting high-technology industriesa preoccupation of many
economic development initiatives. Many of the high-technology indus-
tries offer substantial employment numbers and higher-than-national-
average wages, but they are not the only suchindustries. Investments
in more mature industries that have a commitment to a location may
be equally transformative in providing a source of competitive advan-
tage. The relatively low-technology financial services cluster is, on av-
erage, the highest paying cluster. Inaddition, other mature industries,
for example, printing and publishing or metal manufacturing, have
continued to innovate and provide something that markets value. Dis-
tribution and logistics is another industry based on efficient inventory
control and the process of innovation.
In addition, many of theses clusters represent well-known associa-
tions between places and industries. For example, distribution services
in Atlanta have given the city a long history as a transportation hub,
and Los Angeles has a concentration of entertainment. Certain clusters,
such as education and knowledge creation; analytical instruments,
aerospace vehicles, and defense; communications equipment;informa-
tion technology; and medical devices appear to cluster together and to
be more conducive to multiple clustering than other industries (Porter
2003).
Across the U.S. economy, average wages differ greatly across and
within industry clusters, demonstrating that some industries tend to
produce higher prosperity than others. However, wages in the same
cluster vary substantially by jurisdiction, indicating that jurisdictions
can influence the level of prosperity generatedby a given industry or
cluster. Table 3.2 presents four representative industries, one from
each quartile of the distribution of industry wages. Financial services
are in the first quartile, with meanannual wages of $75,000; medical
devices are in the second quartile, with mean annual wages of $50,000;
metal manufacturing represents the third quartile, with mean annual
wages of $37,200; and building fixtures, equipment,and services is inJurisdictional Advantage 71
Table 3.2
Average wages differ greatly across and within industry dusters
Source: Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness, Cluster Mapping Project, http:I/data.
isc.hbs.edu/isc/index.jsp.
the bottom quartile, with mean annual wages of $31,000. Similarly,the
four cities listed were selected to represent quartiles of thedistribution
of wages within the industry. Each city presented in table3.2 had a lo-
cation quotient greater than 1, which indicates relativespecialization
for the industry within the geographic unit;2a minimum of 1,000
workers; and average wages that are greater than theaverage wages
for the city, as indicated in column (3). Even when thewages are not
high relative to the highest wages for the industry, theyare higher rel-
alive to the mean city wages.
To construct jurisdictional advantage requiresa jurisdictional strat-
egya set of choices that produces a jurisdictional activity system
that in turn generates either low-cost advantageor a differentiation ad-





Ratio of wages to
average city wage
1. Financial services
New Haven, CT 169,699 3.46
Chattanooga, TN-GA 58,381 2.09
Salem, OR 48,628 1.84
Fargo-Moorhead, ND-MN 42,882 1.6
2. Medical devices
Oakland, CA 82,855 1.88
Milwaukee, WI 55,676 1.58
Salt Lake City, UT 46,390 1.53
Riverside-San Bernardino, CA 39,847 1.43
3. Metal manufacturing
Gary, IN 52,849 1.72
Buffalo, NY 38,291 1.27
Chattanooga, TN-GA 33,549 1.2
Scranton, PA 31,725 1.23
4. Building fixtures, equipment, and services
Grand Rapids, MI 39,699 1.21
Cleveland, OH 37,271 1.11
Lancaster, PA 33,064 1.12
Oklahoma City, OK 30,532 1.1372 Feldman and Martin
primarily but not exclusively firms. In many respects, jurisdictions are
collections of firms, both large and small. Just as firms are one eco-
nomic entity that organizes resources and production,jurisdictions
are themselves another economicentity that provides a platform for
organizing resources similarly. High-wage jobs are thereward for the
jurisdiction that can generate advantage and thus attract,incubate,
and grow firms. Jurisdictional advantage produces an environment
that both attracts investments by existing firms to thejurisdiction and
promotes the creation of startup businesses in thejurisdiction. It also
produces an environment that helps all of these firms prosperwhile
operating in that jurisdiction.
The logic of endogenous growth suggests that new startupfirms will
be an important source of growth. New firms arebased on the identifi-
cation of new market opportunities, and they frequently getstarted as
a means to bring newtechnology to the market. Most important, these
firms are relatively immobile geographically because entrepreneurs
build on local networks and expertise. Individuals startcompanies
based on their prior experience and interests, typically fulfilling some
niche that a larger firm may judge too small, exploiting a new opportu-
nity that may have a risk profile unsuited to a largerfirm, or using a
unique set of skifis and knowledge to develop applications.Many indi-
viduals have location inertia because of lack of family mobifity,simple
preferences, or the risk of establishing a new company in a newloca-
tion. Tn building their companies, entrepreneursrely on their local con-
tacts, connections, and knowledge of thebusiness environment.
History is replete with examples of co-located firmsdefining techno-
logical frontiers and speeding up the rate of technological advance.The
geographic concentrations of related industries create synergiesthat
provide unique activity sets that in turn promote the emergenceof
new industries: combining newknowledge with existing expertise is
the essence of innovation. New industries typicallybegin with new-
firm formation and the efforts of entrepreneurs. Someof these new
startups wifi be gazelles in terms of rapidgrowth, creating new indus-
tries and disrupting existing firms in their wake.Most wifi be smaller
players that wifi operate in a niche for which the firm has some com-
petitive advantage.
What is low cost in the context of jurisdictionaladvantage? It is not
low wages, which is the first answer that comes tomind. A low-wage
jurisdictional strategy is like a low-price company strategy. Itdoes not
produce advantage. For a company, a low-price strategy produceslowJurisdictional Advantage 73
profits for the shareholders and is dangerous because it leaves thecom-
pany vulnerable to greater investments by high-profit competitors. In a
jurisdiction, a low-wage strategy produces wages thatare lower than
the average of other jurisdictions, which connotes disadvantage, not
advantage, for its residents.
Approaches centered on industrial recruitment with special tax
incentives and various other inducements to lower the costs of doing
business for firms are not low-cost strategies either. Giving dollars
away to firms is not unique or hard to replicate. Evidence suggests
that this type of strategy is a race to the bottom ina zero-sum game.
No evidence suggests that it leads eventually to higher wages, which
is the measure of a successful low-cost jurisdictional strategy. These
types of operations are frequently the first to close when the cost struc-
ture changes.
A successful low-cost jurisdictional strategy would exist ifa jurisdic-
tion produces an equivalent environment to other jurisdictions but at
a lower cost. For example, the city of Edmonton, Alberta, has produced
a K-12 educational system that generates some of the highest results of
any North American jurisdiction. It accomplished this superior out-
come with below-average costs through unique approaches to man-
agement of the system (Chen and Mintz 2004). This strategy allows
Edmonton to charge lower personal taxes, other things being equal,
which increases the after-tax wages of residents and thus enhances the
competitive outcome of the jurisdiction.
A differentiated jurisdictional strategy exists when a set of activities
produces a uniquely attractive environment for a given segment of
job-providing entities at a similar cost to other jurisdictions yet with
greater potential benefits. An example is the externalities available toa
biotech firm from locating near several industry-leading biotech firms
already operating in the greater Boston area. These externalitiesare
outside the abffity of markets to price, but some evidence suggests
that firms gain economic value from them. Firms are simplymore
productive (better able to innovate and create unique value) in certain
locations. This greater productivity translates into higher profits and
higher wages.
V.Jurisdictional Strategy and Jurisdictional Advantage
The next concern is how a jurisdiction may position itself to capture
economic growth. Economic growth is not easy to capture: thereare74 Feldman and Martin
no guarantees. But the emergingliterature on growth theory and the
new economic geography offer someinsights that may shape jurisdic-
tional advantage. This literature is informed by the microeconomics of
innovation, which suggests the importance of skilled labor and the mix
or composition of activities within a jurisdiction'sactivity system. The
success of a firm and the success of the region areinterrelated, (and
endogenous, in the terminology of economics) and form the basis of
jurisdictional strategy and advantage.
Economists have long known that industries cluster in specific
locations for various reasons. What is critical is that these clustered
industries tend to be more innovative and have greater productivity,
which is why we observe wage premiums for such clusters. An impor-
tant distinction exists between the geographic concentrationsof pro-
duction and the location of innovation. Whereas the geographic
concentrations of production are often due to the location of natural
resources, ease of transportation or historical inertia,the location of in-
novation is due to knowledge externalities and subject to increasing
returns. While innovation yields greater productivity and the increases
in wages that jurisdictions seek, jobs associated with routineproduc-
tion remain geographically in place as long as the physical investments
are economically viable. Once physical assets aredepreciated or obso-
lete, the market changes, or costs become uncompetitive, these loca-
tions are easily abandoned. As a result, property values fall and the
jurisdiction suffers.
The idea that location is beneficial to firms' innovative success is cen-
tral to theorizing in economic geography about the benefits of cities.
Certain locations supply localized knowledge externalities or spifiovers
that provide positive economic value but are beyond the ability of mar-
ket mechanisms to price and allocate efficiently. The significance of
localized knowledge spillovers as inputs to firms' innovative activities
suggests that their most creative and highest value-added activitiesdo
not proceed in isolation but depend on access to new ideas. Location
mitigates the inherent uncertainty of innovative activity: proximity
enhances the abffity of firms to exchange ideas and exchange impor-
tant incipient knowledge, hence reducing uncertainty forfirms that
work in new fields. Innovation clusters spatially where knowledge
externalities reduce the costs of scientific discovery and commercializa-
tion. In addition, firms producing innovations tend to be located in
areas with the necessary resources: resourcesthat have accumulated
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success and city economic growth are endogenous andmutually de-
pendent. The cumulative nature of innovationmanifests itself not just
at firm and industry levels, but also at the geographiclevel, creating
an advantage for firms locating in areas of concentrated innovative
activity. These factors can generate positive feedbackloops, or virtuous
cycles, as clusters attract additional specialized laborand other inputs,
as well as the greater exchanges of ideas.
Economists and strategistsare getting better at understanding the
dynamics of path dependence and increasingreturns, both of which
describe aspects of the dynamics of clustergrowth in a given juris-
diction. Path dependency implies that thecourse of technological de-
velopment or the technological trajectoryof specific localitiesis
historically determined andmay be the result of serendipity or small
events. Krugman (1991) uses the example of candle-wicking,a type of
local craft, as a source of competitive advantagein the carpet industry
and a reason why the industry located in Alabama.Through such
examples, the literature suggests that clustersare seeded by various
methods; however, their growth can be facilitated onlyby building on
existing resources. Clusters cannot be built justanywhere from scratch.
Successful jurisdictions are characterized bya rich environment of
firms and institutions that forma specialized activity set. A good ex-
ample is Carisson's (2002) study of the polymercluster in Akron,
Ohio, which consists of a combination ofnumerous and diverse small
firms as well as larger, multinational firms.Rosenthal and Strange
(2003) find that agglomeration benefitsare greater with a larger num-
ber of small firms: the marginal effect ofan employee at a small estab-
lisl-in-ient is greater than that ofan employee at a large firm. This
finding suggests that small establishmentsmake better neighbors and
increase a nearby firm's own productivity. In addition,Carisson (2002)
found that while the multinationals haveshifted their production
facilities elsewhere, they have kept their polymerR&D facffities and
operations headquarters in thearea and close to the top three polymer
research institutions in the United States, from whomthey obtain re-
search and hire skilled labor.
Skified workers, known in the literatureas human capital, or alterna-
tively as talent, are important to geographicclustering. Baker and Tre-
fler (n.d.) confirm that human capital ismore productive in cities.
Cities act as magnets for human capital, and individualsliving in cities
receive a wage premium when comparedto similar individuals Labor
is less mobile than capital, and workers becomemore skilled as they76 Feldman and Martin
age but thencorrespondingly become more immobile as they form
relationships, raise families, and becomemembers of communities.
One important advantage of geographicclustering is that it provides
pools of skilled labor that are mutuallybeneficial: firms can easily find
specialized skilled labor, and workers can advancetheir careers by
moving between firms without incurringthe costs of relocating.
Within these pools of skified labor there arepotential entrepreneurs
who may take ideas out of establishedfirms to form new enterprises.
An observed anecdote aboutentrepreneurship is that individuals do
not relocate to start firms butinstead use existing local contacts and
networks to do so (Feldman 2001). This formof locational inertia in-
dicates that regions with stocks ofpotential entrepreneurs are more
likely to be successful at promoting new-firm startupsand establishing
new industries. Innovative startupsfrequently create new markets
where no competition exists anddemand is not sensitive to product
costs. Small finns frequently becomethe mechanism by which a new
technology is commercialized, and their competitiveadvantage lies in
being first to market or to offer ahigher-quality product. Lacking the
resources of their larger counterparts,small firms must leverage capa-
bilities in their local environments.
The composition of activities in ajurisdictional activity system mat-
ters. Jacobs (1969) argues thatdiversity is important for innovation
and that cities are the source of considerableinnovation because the
diversity of knowledge is greatest in cities.According to Jacobs, the ex-
change of complementary knowledge acrossdiverse firms and eco-
nomic agents yield a greater return to economicactivity. Feldman and
Audretsch (1999) find that diversity acrosscomplementary economic
activities sharing a common science baseis more conducive to irinova-
tion than is local specialization. Inaddition, their results indicate that
the degree of local competition for new ideaswithin a city is more con-
ducive to innovative activity than in a localmonopoly. Indeed, we may
expect that if a local economy becomes toodependent on one firm or
one industry, it maydrive out new ideas. Florida and Gates (2002)
argue further that a richcultural environment in a jurisdiction is corre-
lated with the economic success of the city. They usethe share of work-
ers in artistic industriessuch as writers, dancers, painters, and others
as an indicator ofcultural richness and find a correlation with eco-
nomic success. In addition, they alsofind a link between the levels
of open-mindedness in a jurisdiction to becorrelated with economic
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Porter (1990) studied clusters around theworld, and we now know
the features of a jurisdictional environmentin which clusters grow.
Porter described clusters as a local diamondrepresenting the beneficial
interaction of (1) demanding and sophisticated localcustomers, (2) an
intense rivalry among local firms, (3) the localpresence of attractive
factors of production, and (4) the localpresence of relating and sup-
porting industries. These four factors interactto drive continuous inno-
vation and upgrading of the nature of advantageby the firms in the
cluster. We are also learning how clustersinteract with each other
that is, the clustering of clusters (Porter2003). Certain clusters (for ex-
ample, education and knowledge creation;analytical instruments,
aerospace vehicles, and defense; communications equipment;informa-
tion technology; and medical devices)appear to cluster together. The
synergies between these industries provideunique activity sets, and
areas with multiple and overlapping clusters of expertise facffitatethe
emergence of new industries such as nanotechnology, bioinformatics,
and advanced telecommunications.
It is clear that jurisdictional strategy isnot a winner-take-all phe-
nomenon in which a single city comes to dominate. No jurisdiction
found on earth is successful at most industries.Each jurisdictional
activity system appears to be tuned for certainindustries and not for
others. Cities are part of the system of cities,or what urban economists
call an urban hierarchy:every city has a unique niche that is interre-
lated to other cities. Duranton and Puga (2001)find that new products
tend to be developed in large, diversified cities,which they term nurs-
ery cities, the places where new products are incubated. Oncean idea
is refined, the firm invests inmore specialized, smaller cities where
production costs are lower because ofan emphasis on process in-
novation and learning-by-doing. Each type ofinnovation requires a
different mix of skills; however, innovationsare complementary and
each has a role to play in competitive advantage.
It does appear (in North America at least) thatvery large cities foster
the clustering of clusters, which produceseven higher wage levels than
would be expected undera straight line regression (Institute for Com-
petitiveness and Prosperity 2003). This situationalso appears in the
United Kingdom, with London emergingas a cluster of clusters. Few
cities wifi be at the top tier of the urban hierarchy;however, every
jurisdictional activity set has a place in thehierarchy. Understanding
how a city is positioned relativeto other cities, not in a competitive78 Feldman and Martin
sense but in terms of mutualdependence and differentiation, offers a
potential strategic lever.
Uniqueness and adaptation, not uniformityand replication, provide
jurisdictional advantage. If all corporate competitorssimply bench-
mark against each other and replicate whatthe other is doing as part
of a corporate strategy, none of them wifihave an advantage and the
benefits wifi flow to the customers, who wifisimply play the look-alike
firms against each other to suppress prices.Exactly the same principle
may be expected tohold for jurisdictions. Competitive advantage
and economic growth may come fromthe creation of unique activity
systems, not from simply replicating oneanother. Benchmarking is
currently a popular notion in economicdevelopment policy, but the
problem with benchmarking is that it appearsto encourage duplica-
tion and uniformity, not diversityand the exploration of unique
advantage.
VI. The Role of Firms in JurisdictionalAdvantage
A big question concerns the role of firms injurisdictional advantage. A
firm can act simply as a taker and exploiterof a jurisdiction. A firm is
better served, however, when it is an active partnerin jurisdictional
advantage rather than a passive taker. As soon asit has made invest-
ments in a jurisdiction, it has an incentive tomake the jurisdiction bet-
ter so that the jurisdiction provides moreadvantages in the future.
The existence of externalities suggests thatfirms receive benefits that
are outside the marketmechanism. While it may be argued that firms
pay more taxes as aresult of the higher profits they earn as a result in
turn of externalities, it may also beargued that firms can actively culti-
vate the sources of the agglomerativebenefit by investing in local
universities, building infrastructure, etc. Theseinvestments are tax de-
ductible and provide a means to maketargeted investments in jurisdic-
tions rather than relying on the processof government budgeting; that
is, those firms may actively buildthe external resources and infrastruc-
ture that benefit their bottom line.
Case study evidence suggests that in the processof building their
firm expertise, entrepreneurs alsocontribute to building external
resources and institutionsthat promote their business interest. hi the
process of building theirfirms, entrepreneurs contribute to building
the cluster (Feldman 2001). Sponsoringresearch at local universities,
endowing university training programs,and networking all benefitJurisdictional Advantage
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the initiating firm but alsocreate externalities that wifi have local bene-
fit. As entrepreneurial businessesbegin to thrive, resources suchas
money, networks, experts, and relatedservices develop in andare
attracted to the region. With thisinfrastructure in place, more entrepre-
neurial ventures locate and thrive in theregion, which ultimatelymay
create a thriving cluster wherenone previously existed.
In addition, interestinginterplays exist between firms and theaver-
age wage level of residents of the jurisdiction.In many senses, the
better definition of advantagemay be the total utility of residents,
which includes nonmonetaryas well as monetary benefits. Firmscan
positively influence the overall welfareof residents in the jurisdiction
by showing some socialresponsibility, which produces externalities
that further enhance the jurisdictionand also benefit of the firm.
Corporate outsourcing is alsoimportant in its relation to jurisdic-
tional advantage. Outsourcing isnot an issue of jurisdictional advan-
tage or disadvantage perse. Bangalore does not have jurisdictional
advantage over Sfficon Valley.Bangalore is a price leader, nota cost
leader. It produces dramaticallylower wage levels than Silicon Valley
does, so in this respect, it isat a great disadvantage. However,Banga-
lore has a powerful advantageover other parts of India. This is not
jurisdictional as much as it is individual.It turns out that many rote
programmers, call-center attendants, etc.,are learning to their dismay
that the clearing price for their skifiset in Silicon Valley is a fraction of
what it used to be, thanks to fallingtelecommunications and coordina-
tion costs.
An issue, however, is whether thefirm has a responsibility to its ju-
risdiction not to outsource becauseof the dislocation costs thatout-
sourcing causes. There is no clearanswer on this issue. What is clear is
that as firms outsource jobs fromSilicon Valley to Bangalore, they
reduce the number of existinghigh-wage jobs in Silicon Valley.The
question is, Can they createan equal number of new high-paying jobs
locally? If they can't, the employmentbase in Silicon Valley wifi drop.
To the extent that the jurisdiction benefitedfrom the economies of scale
associated with large numbers of skifiedworkers, firms that engage in
the net export of high-paying jobsmay negatively affect the jurisdic-
tional advantage of their hometerritory.
What do firms lose when theyoutsource? Various historicalexam-
ples, such as semiconductors, showthat the countries thatwere the
site of outsourcing becamecompetitors in subsequent rounds of prod-
uct development. What is lost inoutsourcing may be a familiarity with80
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production and product design thatsuggest the next round of innova-
tion (Pisano 1994). Chesbroughand Teece (1996) argue that outsourc-
ing may hamper the kindof complex, systematic innovationthat
creates valuable new-generationbusiness breakthroughs.
VII.Important Issues to Tackle inJurisdictional Advantage
The challenge for jurisdictionaladvantage is the translation of theory
into practical policy terms. Manyexisting recommendations are far too
generic, emphasizing thedesirabifity of having an educated, creative,
and efficient workforce alongwith a strong physical infrastructureand
great centers for researchand teaching. Specific recommendations are
usually based on reinforcing thoseactivities that a location currently
specializes in, in other words, thoseeconomic sectors and activities
that make up a high share of acity's activities.
Jurisdictional advantage depends on anadditional criterion: those
activities and capabilities that incombination create a uniquely
favorable jurisdiction for some setof industries. While generic capabil-
ities are important, far too manylocations satisfy basic criteria; a
highly educated workforce, byitself, is no guarantee for acity-specific
advantage.
Simply being specialized in an activityalso does not mean that a re-
gion has a strong advantage in thatactivity. As we have shown earlier,
a jurisdiction canhave a disproportionatelyhigh number of jobs in a
given cluster and stifi havebelow-average wage levels in that cluster.
Instead, jurisdictional advantagecould be established and maintained
by implementing policies thatenhance unique and location-specific
capabffities.
In this context, a key question is,In what practical, action-oriented
ways can jurisdictionsbuild a coherent activity system? Giventhe im-
portance of the private choicesof firms and employees, it isunlikely
that successful jurisdictional activitysystems wifi be built exclusively
or even primarily bygovernments. Most likely, theywifi require the
cooperation of governments andfirms. An important responsibffityfor
governments wifi be to createincentives that encourage firmsand
talented employees to take positivecluster- and jurisdiction-building
activities.
Taxation policy is likely to be critical.It is unlikely that bidding wars
based on targeted tax relief to attract afirm to the jurisdiction may cre-
ate a positive benefit becauseof the abifity of other jurisdictions to pro-Jurisdictional Advantage
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vide the same benefits. Atax system that accounts for theneeds of the
specific clusters of interest forthe jurisdiction is most likelyto produce
beneficial results. For example,tradable tax credits allowstartup firms
to sell their net operating lossesand research and developmentspend-
ing to profitable companiesor sell the credits back to the state. Mintz
(2001) argues that the marginaltax burden on capital and laborpreva-
lent in a jurisdiction influencesits prosperity. Therefore, spendingpro-
grams designed to attract firms (directlyor indirectly) may benefit
from empirical analysis thatquantifies the purported benefitsnetted
against their costs in terms of highermarginal tax burden to ascertain
whether these incentives producenet benefits or costs.
One element that hasno chance of being unique is thepayment of
cash incentives to firms. Cashis completely fungible and forthat rea-
son, it is the easiest feature for anotherjurisdiction to match. Cash
used as an incentive hasno effective leverage. It costs residentsof the
jurisdiction dollar for dollar againstpotential personal after-tax income
rather than, for example,a badly needed bridge that has theprospect
of earning an extremely highreturn on the investment made.
The evidence suggests thatfirm-location decisionsare not respon-
sive to jurisdictional taxdifferentials except at theintrametropolitan
area (Bartik 1991, Papke 1991). This findingsuggests that individual
municipalities may gain if they droptheir tax rates or offerspecial
incentives. Of course, thisapproach creates artificialcompetition. In-
dividual municipalitiesmay benefit if they view themselvesas sub-
sidiaries or divisions of the largercity and cooperate to theirmutual advantage.
In the knowledge-basedeconomy, social policy may not be dis-
counted as something aliento jurisdictional advantage. Itappears to
be an integral part of jurisdictionalstrategy (Porter 1999, Florida and
Gates 2002). Attributes thatmake a jurisdictionan attractive place for
talented workers to locateare powerful elements in the activitysystem
of successful jurisdictions. Asalways in jurisdictionalstrategy, the
question is, Can a given socialpolicy create more benefit inraising
the psychic income andquality of life of residents thanit takes away
in the taxation requiredto support it?
In establishing policy,jurisdictions wifi have to findways to be as
nimble as the firms they host.Successful firms are constantlyremaking
themselves and reinventing theircore businesses in response to chang-
ing market conditions. It is ofteneasier for them to move toa new loca-
tion rather than work withinthe confines of an existingjurisdiction. It82
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might be incumbent onjurisdictions to change that equationby being
responsive and open to workingwith their resident firms. A frequent
complaint is that local government paysattention to a firm only when
it threatens to leaverather than cultivating an ongoingrelationship
with the firm.
Jurisdictional advantage is notsimply the battle for high-technology
industries. In no jurisdiction dohigh-technology industries make up a
majority of jobs. Even inhigh-technology states such asMassachusetts
and California, high-technologyclusters account for less than 20 per-
cent of jobs (Institutefor Competitiveness and Prosperity2003). While
high-technology clusters maybe attractive, there is as much tobe
gained by creating a unique activitysystem for a non-high-technology
cluster as in replicating thefeatures of numerous otherjurisdictions
that are pining after high-technologyindustries:
Cities remake themselves overtime, reflecting structural changes
in the economy. Glaeser(2003) shows how Boston hasbeen able to re-
make its economy three timessince the colonial era becauseof the
availabifity of local skilled capital.Of course, these transitions are
costly to individuals and theirfamilies when skifi sets becomeobsolete
and jobs disappear. Thisresult reiterates the importanceof social
policy as the backbone ofindustrial competitiveness andeconomic
growth.
In corporate strategy, an immensevariety of activity systems pro-
vide competitive advantage;the same is likely to be truewith jurisdic-
tional strategy. While many firmslook longingly at Wal-mart orDell
and decide they need to pursue aWal-mart strategy or a Dell strategy,
they are much more likely toproduce a successful strategy by pursu-
ing an approach tailored totheir particular circumstancesand assets.
Similarly, jurisdictions that try tobe the next Boston or SiliconValley
may be pursuing the wrongapproach to jurisdictional advantage.Any
commitments of resources to anactivity involve trade-offs against
other opportunities. We havesuggested that building jurisdictionalad-
vantage necessitates anunderstanding of what not to doand how
investments detract from thecoherence of the jurisdictionalactivity
set: policy makers will berequired to investigate further intojust how
to do this at theparticular sites they make decisionsfor.
As with the multiplicity of outcomesof jurisdictional strategy, many
different models are likely to emergewith respect to how jurisdictions
organize themselves to facifitatethe creation and implementationof ju-
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functional and industrial specialization, each witha unique position
relative to other cities in the economy. Evenmore so than with corpo-
rate strategy, jurisdictional strategy is likely to be only inpart an ana-
lytical, top-down exercise; it is more likely to bean intensely social,
consensus-building exercise. As such, the role of political leadershipin
jurisdictional strategy is likely to be crucial.
At the national level, it wifi be increasingly importantto understand
the role of individual city jurisdictions play in competitiveadvantage.
If a nation is comprised of individual jurisdictions, each following
copycat strategies of using cash incentives to attract the currently
vogue industries (e.g., biotechnology or nanotechnology) to their juris-
diction rather than another national jurisdiction, thenation's prosper-
ity potential wifi be diminished. If instead the nation iscomprised of
individual jurisdictions, each attempting to createan activity system
that is uniquely beneficial to a particular clusteror agglomeration of
clusters by investing in attributes that make it particularlyattractive to
firms and talent in those clusters, the nation wifi havean increased
prosperity potential. In this paper, we have argued that jurisdictions
may benefit from a strategic orientation that considers (1) the unique
and not easily replicated assets, resources, and skifiset contained in a
jurisdiction; (2) the position of the jurisdiction vis-à-vis the hierarchy
of cities in the national and world economy; and (3) themaximization
of wages and property values within the juridiction.What we have
suggested is that the role of jurisdictions and jurisdictional advantage
deserves a place on the policy agenda.
Notes
Prepared for the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Innovationand the
Economy Conference (Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 13, 2004). Thispaper has bene-
fited from comments and suggestions by Scott Stern, Josh Lerner, WifiStrange, and
Wendy Dobson. Rich Bryden at the Institute for Strategy and Competitivenessprovided
assistance with data. Comments are welcome.
We will use the term city to refer to the integrated economic entity suchas the metro-
politan statistical areas as defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Thus,we focus on
the city as a focal point for economic activity, similar to people saying thatthey live in
Los Angeles even though their residence is in West Hollywood. Thisuse of the term city
typically encompasses multiple political or administrative units. Rather thanviewing
themselves in competition, these units may be conceptualizedas subsidiaries, divisions,
or subunits of a going concern.
The location quotient is calculated as the percentage of activity ina city, and industry
is normalized by the national percentage of activity in the industry. A locationquotient84 Feldman and Martin
equal to 1 indicates that the activity is represented in the city exactly asmirrored in the
national economy. When the location quotient is greater than 1, the industry has a greater
representation in the city than would be expected, which is evidence of geographic con-
centration. The larger the location quotient, the greater the concentrationof the industry
in the city.
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